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2 I N T R O D U C T I O N :  K E Y  C O N C E P T SA1
‘LEGAL LANGUAGE’ AS A LINGUISTIC VARIETY
In this unit, we introduce the concept of legal language, perhaps the most obvious and
traditionally debated intersection between language and law. The expression legal
language designates what is often considered to be a recognisable linguistic variety,
differing from other kinds of language use such as medical discourse, news reporting,
Dorset dialect or underworld slang. But does a variety matching the name exist? And
if so, what kind of variety is it: a dialect, register or something else?
In order to refine the concept of legal language, we introduce sociolinguistic con-
cepts that help distinguish different kinds of linguistic variation. In related units, we
extend our exploration of the concept: in Unit B1, we examine specific linguistic
features associated with the variety, and in Unit C1 we examine contrasting views
expressed about it. In Thread 2 (i.e. Units A2, B2, C2 and D2), we describe this com -
plicated variety’s historical development and the purposes it is thought to serve, 
as well as reasons why many people feel it is in need of reform if it is to achieve those
purposes.
Scope of legal language
If you ask people what legal language is the language of, you will get different answers.
Some say it is the language in which laws and legal documents are written: constitutions,
treaties, statutes, law reports, wills or contracts. Others add courtroom and police
language (spoken as well as written, and about legal topics generally or only when
oriented towards litigation). Some also include non-professional use of language that
is about law (e.g. in newspaper features), wherever discussion draws on legal
terminology or style to represent a specific topic. Some maintain that ‘legal language’
is whatever lawyers say about law (including colloquial in-group talk), whereas talk on
the same subject by other people is ‘talk about law’ but not legal language.
Whatever boundaries we adopt, what we call ‘legal language’ is a kind of discourse:
a variably classifiable set of utterances with enough regularities to contrast fairly
consistently with other kinds (e.g. with the language of parenting, cricket, menus or
hairdresser talk). At the same time, legal language is evidently not a single, unified
variety. Rather, it is a cluster of uses, distributed on dimensions that need to be
disentangled. Merely aggregating these as ‘legal language’ constructs only a stereotype:
part statute, part contract, part courtroom scenes from films, and drifting between
historical periods and legal systems.
In a summary of research (including his own earlier work with Derek Davy on the
language of legal documents in Crystal and Davy 1969), Crystal (2010: 374) describes
the language of legislation as follows:
[it] depends a great deal on a fairly small set of grammatical and lexical features. For
example, modal verbs (e.g. must, shall, may) distinguish between obligation and discretion.
Pronouns (e.g. all, whoever) and generic nouns (hypernyms, e.g. vehicle, person) help foster
a law’s general applicability.
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Such formal description is suddenly far more precise, and can be extended by
quantitative analysis of a corpus of representative texts. But some features of legislative
language will also be found, in a different combination and with different frequency,
in a contract or other private law documents. They will not be entirely absent, either,
from the generally more discursive idiom of a judicial opinion as presented in a law
report. One task in understanding legal language, therefore, is to differentiate within
the legal variety as well as between legal and other varieties.
The term legal language
The phrase legal language is one among a cluster of terms used to describe a general
field of study. Such terms include language and law, the reverse-order phrase law and
language, the language of the law and language in law, as well as forensic linguistics. Both
the order of terms and choice of preposition are live issues, as are the differences
between language and linguistics and between law and forensic. The content of the
resulting field, which Tiersma (2009: 11) describes as ‘relatively fractured’, is usefully
summarised in Gibbons and Turrell (2008), as well as – slightly differently – on the
website of the International Association of Forensic Linguists (www.iafl.org). At its
broadest, topics in the field include written legal discourse (sources of law, and judicial
declaration or interpretation of the law), spoken legal discourse (e.g. police and court
interaction), linguistic evidence, legal education, translation and interpreting. Nuances
between names and what they denote have been much discussed in the literature.
In countries where English is not the primary language of the legal system, legal
language often goes under another name, partly because it is typically studied for
different reasons. The phrase legal English (LE) is often used, for example, to mean
competence in English for the legal workplace (Northcott 2013). Such approaches to
legal language prioritise an applied, ‘language proficiency’ interest in how law works
in English, an interest driven by a regionally varying combination of two forces:
❏ the international footprint of historically Anglo-American common-law legal
systems in countries formerly colonised by or under the influence of English-
speaking countries; and
❏ increased use globally of English as a legal lingua franca for commercial contracts
and in formulating and enforcing public international law.
In these contexts, legal language, in English, is far less a variety absorbed during
legal training, and is sometimes referred to as learning to talk like a lawyer; it is actively
taught and certified (e.g. by assessments such as TOLES (Test of Legal English Skills)
and ILEC (the International Legal English Certificate)). A good example of instruction
in this idiom is Riley and Sours (2014).
Less attitudinally neutral than the terms above, legalese (along with legal jargon, legal
argot and similar expressions) has a pejorative meaning: legal use of language that is
clumsy, confusing or inefficient. Despite the apparent formality of legal discourse,
lawyers are also sometimes said to use legal slang, an insider discourse between
professionals.
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While introducing terminology, we should note a further contrast implied by the
term legal language: the contrast with ‘illegal language’. Such language indicates use
restricted or forbidden by specific laws, systems of extrajudicial regulation, and either
binding or voluntary speech codes. We consider this rather different relation between
language and law in Thread 8.
What kind of variety is legal language?
The term variety, to continue with writing by Crystal by referring to his Dictionary of
Linguistics and Phonetics (2008: 372), signifies ‘any system of linguistic expression whose
use is governed by situational variables. Classification of different kinds of discourse
may be made by reference to subject matter, the situation, or the behaviour of the
speaker’. In some cases, Crystal continues, situational distinctness can be easily stated
(e.g. as regards regional and occupational varieties). In other cases, perhaps especially
in relation to social class, varieties are more difficult to define because they involve
intersection of a number of variables (e.g. sex, age, region, class and occupation).
Varieties also change according to purpose and over time (reflecting stylistic fashions
as well as longer-term language change). What kind or kinds of variety, we should
therefore ask, is ‘legal language’?
Reflecting Crystal’s point above, legal language appears to involve a number of
variables. There are professionals (lawyers, judges, others) dealing with a field (or
domain of activity: laws and their enforcement). Those professionals do so in certain
settings of use (e.g. in a solicitor’s office, in the courtroom), for specified purposes (to
impose obligations, plead a case, issue a court order). One of the challenges in thinking
about language and law, accordingly – and within that field, thinking about what
constitutes the core concept of ‘legal language’ – is to understand how this variety relates
to recognised axes of linguistic variation.
How lawyers talk and what they talk about
Linguists including Halliday have classified varieties by drawing a general distinction
between variation determined by characteristics of the language user and variation
related to situations of use.
❏ Variation by language user is known as dialect if variation is regional or determined
by social structure; such variation includes grammatical and lexical distinctiveness,
as well as pronunciation. It is known as accent if variation is regional or determined
by social structure but restricted to pronunciation. The alternative term sociolect
refers to a linguistic variety (a lect) defined on social rather than regional grounds.
❏ Variation associated with different topics, fields and contexts of use – including
the relationship between participants – is known in stylistics and sociolinguistics
as register (Halliday and Hasan 1976). Varieties of this type include registers of
scientific, religious and academic English. In Hallidayan linguistics, because
registers can be contrasted at different levels and in different ways, they are further
classified on the basis of three aspects: their field (subject matter), their mode (the
medium: spoken or written) and their manner or tenor of discourse (the
relationship between participants). Some linguists (e.g. Biber and Conrad 2009)
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distinguish between register and style, while others (Crystal and Davy 1969) have
used style with a wider meaning close to that of register (alongside the more familiar
sense of a personally distinct authorial imprint).
In a useful online summary and critical account of legal language, Tiersma (2000)
poses a central, provocative question in the form of a subheading: ‘So what is legal
language exactly?’ He then answers his own question:
Legal language has been called an argot, a dialect, a register, a style, and even a separate
language. In fact, it is best described with the relatively new term sublanguage. A
sublanguage has its own specialized grammar, a limited subject matter, contains lexical,
syntactic, and semantic restrictions, and allows ‘deviant’ rules of grammar that are not
acceptable in the standard language.
There is undoubtedly complex interaction between the variables. Legal language,
Tiersma maintains, is not a dialect, but does have dialects of its own, since it varies
according to place. Because of their differing legal systems, UK and US lawyers use
different words for many similar concepts; and in countries such as India, legal English
contains terms for indigenous legal concepts as well as terms imposed under British
colonization. Legal language across all these places shows shared register characteristics,
nevertheless. These include use of long and complex sentences, unusual word order,
antiquated vocabulary, apparently tautologous expressions, passive constructions,
ritualistic idioms and formal terms of address. There are also period-specific styles that
make it feasible, despite the conservatism of modern legal language, to distinguish
between documents written in different periods, and there are author-specific styles
associated with particular judges, such as Justice Antonin Scalia in the USA or Lord
Denning in the UK (usually judges presiding in a legal system’s uppermost, apex court).
In addition to these dimensions of variation, there are recognisable differences that
correlate with different legal purposes (e.g. a constitution is formulated in broader terms
than a statute or contract, and all of these differ from a law report), and there are
differences between spoken or written monologues, such as a judge setting out his or
her reasoning in deciding a case, and legal dialogue, such as argument that takes place
during a closed hearing in a judge’s chambers or during more abstract legal discussion
characteristic of a Supreme Court.
Combine all these variables, and ‘legal language’ may well be a ‘sublanguage’
according to Tiersma’s definition. Whatever it is called, the variety cannot be considered
homogeneous. While a broad contrast can be made with language use in other fields,
legal language involves finely shaded, overlapping styles that call for more legally
situated, interdisciplinary analysis if we are to understand the interaction between
language and law.
Does it matter what kind of variety ‘legal language’ is?
Distinguishing between user and use varieties is helpful descriptively, even if it is
ultimately simplistic. Social markers (including age, region, class, job) intersect with
situations of language use, especially in urban societies with considerable geographical
and social mobility. Code-mixing and code-switching are extensive, both among
bilinguals who switch between languages and among monolinguals whose style
repertoire includes code-switching between varieties, some of which might traditionally
be thought of as regional or class dialects. All these kinds of variation may be reflected
in legal language.
Complications associated with what language varieties signify also matter. Speakers’
varying ease in switching in and out of a class or regional dialect, when they wish to,
in order to fit in with or adopt some other stance in relation to given settings can affect
professional success. Some linguists prefer the dynamic term repertoire to the more
static contrast between dialect and register in order to emphasise such significance. The
relative difficulty involved in acquiring legal language as a variety also matters, because
law is not simply a semantic field such as the weather or geometry, but a professional
practice steeped in tradition, subject to intense educational selectivity, and respectful
of accentuated hierarchy. Law as a field exhibits complex shadings of language use
among different institutions, topics, practitioners and purposes. Such semiotic micro-
variation signals professional and social relationships both within law and between the
legal system and the wider public who are subject to law in a given legal jurisdiction.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL ENGLISH
The four units that make up Thread 2 develop our exploration of legal language as a
variety. In this unit, we outline the history of legal English; in Unit B2, we discuss
specialised legal and social functions served by legal language; and in Unit C2, we
consider arguments for and against reform of how legislation is written. The present
unit introduces each of these themes by showing how the distinctive features of modern
legal English are the result of sociolinguistic complexity during successive periods
leading into the more stable situation of English, including legal English, from the late
seventeenth century onwards. We suggest that modern perceptions of legal English are
affected not so much by the variety’s specific historical features (which are broadly
consistent with the wider history of the language), but by the fact that historical
substrata have persisted far more than in general usage, as collectively a marker of
linguistic conservatism.
Key moments in the history of English
We begin by outlining key moments in the wider history of the English language,
focusing especially on contact between different languages.
1 Although there is a complicated and interesting history of languages in the land
mass that is now Great Britain prior to the eighth century AD, the impact of that
linguistic history on modern legal uses of language was not significant. There is,
for instance, little continuity between the Latin brought by the Romans in 43 BC
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